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ABSTRACT 
 
The design and development of large scale complex engineered systems requires 
dependence and coordination of thousands of individuals. In practice, this has shown to span 
industries, encompassing multiple companies and organizations, and force decisions to be 
driven mainly by customer requirements. One issue in this development process is related to 
the stakeholders’ desires and their ability to effectively communicate their preferences to the 
design teams. Value-Driven Design is an approach stemming from systems engineering that 
addresses this issue by directly incorporating the operational context of the system in this 
communication of preference.  
Value-Driven Design is formed on the premise that a design can be created that 
maximizes the design organization’s preference. It is recognized that other preferences, 
possibly competing, exist as well and will have an influence on the design. This thesis 
explores how the negotiation of value preferences can be captured in bargaining models to 
determine the optimal design for the set of negotiators, taking into account conflicting 
preferences and player impatience. A notional strategic strike aircraft system is used as an 
example to illustrate the importance of design perspectives in the emerging practice of 
Value-Driven Design. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Engineers seek ways to improve the design process, targeting both the efficiency and 
the elegancy of the methods used. Whether it is in model development, optimization 
sequencing, or more business-oriented aspects such as organizational hierarchy and how to 
communicate preference [1-5], new ideas are being tested to enhance system design and find 
optimal systems. This thesis focuses on preference communication in the design process and 
how it affects the outcome of the final system. Presently, the customer provides requirements 
and specifications for the contractor to meet [6]. Any system design satisfying those 
conditions is considered acceptable. However, this is still a system that only satisfies 
constraints describing what is not desired for the system. The primary preference for the 
system is operationally focused, either in a business-operations sense or in a mission-
completion sense, depending on the type of customer [7]. Examples of operational goals are 
maximizing profit, minimizing cost, and maximizing mission success. This thesis considers 
the ways to design systems using primary preferences. 
Even with using primary preferences to drive the design process of a system, further 
considerations need to be made on the relationship between the buyer and the seller. The 
market structures for many engineered systems are not strictly competitive but lean more 
towards monopolies, requiring a strong relationship between the contractor and client. For 
many systems though, there is a clear disconnect in the desires between the two players when 
each is focused on their individual primary preference. 
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A military customer, being an entity of its respective government, may desire a new 
strategic strike aircraft with a high probability of mission success for supporting campaigns 
over the next 20-30 years. In contrast, the contractor for this program, being a publicly held 
entity, will have a preference for maximizing their profit when working on the system. These 
two preferences signify an inconsistency in the characterization of the “optimal” design. One 
design will have the best design characteristics related to the highest probability of mission 
success (at likely a steep price), the other will have the best design characteristics related to 
the highest profit (with likely a probability of mission success that is not the highest). It is 
important to understand the perspective to take in the design process. This thesis identifies 
the inconsistencies between perspectives and possible mechanisms to resolve the issue to 
better enable a design optimization process where all players are satisfied with the outcome. 
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CHAPTER 2  
BACKGROUND 
 
The recognition for an alternative method to communicate design preference has 
surfaced in the world of Large-Scale, Complex Engineered Systems (LSCES). These systems 
can be identified by the number of levels of integration required for the system, the amount 
of technology development needed, and the high cost of completing and maintaining the 
program. Development may last for over a decade and the costs may surpass the billion 
dollar mark, some on their way to 100x beyond that [8]! The aerospace industries, including 
civil, defense, and space, as well as the power and transportation industries are populated by 
LSCES. The process by which these systems are designed is changing, with a renewed focus 
on the operational need [5]. 
Value-Driven Design is an emerging method that better enables the ability to 
characterize optimal system designs. This is done by directly incorporating the primary 
preference for the system, the operational need, into the design sequence. This chapter talks 
about systems engineering, design optimization, and the evolving role of preference 
communication. 
Systems Engineering 
Systems engineering (SE) grew as a discipline used to tackle difficult design 
problems when industry leaders in the second half of the 20th century started to see that 
combining the best parts did not always produce the best whole. Many of the systems this 
trend applied to were interdisciplinary and the connections between those disciplines were 
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typically where the troubles would lay. Before the implementation of SE, the system design 
would be passed from one specialized team to the next. Each team would add their 
contribution to the project and hand it off to the next team. This process did not allow for the 
teams to work together, leaving the design to be mostly driven by the first specialized team. 
Early aircraft programs were driven mostly by the performance team and designed for a 
single performance attribute, such as range, endurance, or stability, for example. This 
consecutive design method made it difficult for revisions or cross-discipline compromises to 
occur as they would prolong development time and increase the cost, even if it would 
improve another performance attribute. With the addition of SE to the design process, 
however, these compromises can be anticipated and then incorporated during the early stages 
of development to enable the specialized design teams to work side by side. This cooperative 
design method is used with the idea of creating better systems at lower costs. 
The SE team will start by identifying what the customer wants and then communicate 
those ideas to their subsystem engineering teams, typically in the form of system 
requirements. The subsystem engineers will communicate additional requirements to the 
groups they rely on and the process continues to the end of the supply chain. This is the 
“Decomposition and Definition” phase in Figure 1: the classic “V-model” [6, 9] of the 
system development lifecycle. These requirements specify desires on technical performance 
attributes of the system but can also relate to economic performance, such as cost. Other 
requirements may be added too, such as applicable ones from the FAA, IEEE, or ISO. The 
system engineering teams constrain the design space and then depend on their design 
engineers to find a solution in the space that remains, called the feasible design space. For 
large scale complex engineered systems (LSCES) this work flow requires an industry. 
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Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for the F-35 Lightning II aircraft, but Northrop 
Grumman, BAE Systems, and Pratt and Whitney all play prominent roles in the system life 
cycle as well [10]. 
Systems Engineering focuses 
on managing the lifecycle of the 
system. In the Decomposition and 
Definition phase, this includes 
managing the design process and 
determining which configuration 
best meets the stakeholders’ desires. 
One of the current practices is for 
engineers to conduct trade-studies to pick which experiments to run and which results are 
better. This decision tool is needed most when one or more of the requirements are not yet 
satisfied or are competing. Trade space exploration has extensively been studied, looking at 
ways to best represent results in multi-dimensional problems [11, 12]. 
Integration and qualification procedures follow as the sub-systems and components 
are defined, designed, and developed. These assemblies are verified and validated along the 
way as well (see Figure 1), to ensure they meet the specifications that were laid out from the 
beginning. This process continues through all levels of subsystem assemblies to final 
assembly. Ideally, the final assembly meets the customer’s expectations and development is 
complete, onward to full-scale production. If not, revisions must be made to the design, as is 
represented in a faded manner in Figure 1. This iteration later in the development lifecycle is 
costly and is hardly an option for LSCES. The development took many years; it would be 
 
Figure 1. Systems engineering V-model and the 
Traditional, Top-Down process 
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cheaper to start a new program than revise the current one. The desires may have to be 
tailored at this phase so that the program can continue.  
Multidisciplinary Design Optimization 
Multidisciplinary Design Optimization (MDO) allows for more foresight in the 
design process. When the design space is complex, the design structure requires some 
iteration to find the best solution. The fields of 
Multidisciplinary Design Optimization and Multi-
Objective Optimization (MOO) have created several 
frameworks to allow for this [13-15]. Working mostly in 
the conceptual and preliminary phases of design, MDO and 
MOO establish couplings between the different analyses 
required in the design structure. Figure 2 shows an example 
layout of the workflow between 4 distinct disciplines, 
called a design structure matrix (DSM) [16]. For aircraft design, this may include Finite 
Element Analysis (FEA) to estimate structural loadings and deflections, Computational Fluid 
Dynamics (CFD) to estimate aerodynamic loadings, stability analysis to estimate control 
surface sizes and response times, and performance calculations to estimate operational 
capabilities, to name a few. The academic world and industry alike have done well with 
finding innovative ways to automate the workflow and reduce overall computation time [4, 
17-19]. Detailed design can be completed with MDO as well, but the simulation times may 
be cost-prohibitive to do on a global scale for LSCES.  
 
Figure 2. Example design 
structure matrix 
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To guide the optimization process, an objective function is used in addition to the 
system requirements. Objective functions may emulate a single performance attribute, such 
as the operating range of an aircraft, the output of a power plant, or the payload capacity of a 
rocket. Objective functions may account for multiple performance attributes as well, using a 
“weighting” scheme to prioritize the attributes. These functions typically do not have a 
physical meaning due to the mathematical disconnect between the attributes being 
“weighted” and the resulting inconsistent unit types. This evaluation criterion does enable the 
optimization process but is usually not something created by the customers. It is created by 
the engineers as an attempt to mathematically represent intuition and is still open to bias and 
subjectivity. Which single performance attribute should be chosen? Which collection of 
attributes should be chosen? How should they be weighted? Is the weighting scheme 
appropriate? 
Preference Communication 
Systems engineering uses requirements to communicate preferences on the system 
design. Multidisciplinary design optimization adds an objective function to this set of criteria 
so an optimization process can occur. Requirements work to find acceptable solutions, 
objective functions work to find optimal solutions. Both methods are used with the idea of 
finding better system designs but have fallen short in one respect: they do not communicate 
the operational desire. They play with this idea, they flirt with it, but they never go for it. 
Value-Driven Design (VDD), an emerging design practice, takes a different approach 
to influencing system design. The methods and styles of work have not changed but the 
design preference and the way it is communicated has. VDD uses an economic based 
8 
objective function to directly communicate the operational desire for the system. The truly 
optimal system can be found by bringing the operational context of the desired system into 
the design sequence. These systems will be characterized by their abilities to maximize 
company profit, surplus value, the probability of operational success, etc., depending on the 
type of system and the characteristics of the stakeholders. 
Requirements Driven Design and Secondary Preferences 
The well-established method of designing LSCES is by placing requirements on 
systems, sub-systems, sub-sub-systems, etc [6]. The group of players influencing the final 
design of a LSCES can work simultaneously when they are each given requirements to 
satisfy. Government stakeholders, like the Department of Defense (DoD) or the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), will hold design competitions to identify the 
better system between industry leaders’ proposed systems. The competition usually starts 
with a request for proposal (RFP) containing a collection of requirements for the desired 
system to meet. Figures 3a and 3b show the design spaces when using, and not using, this 
method to communicate preference. Engineers have a constrained space to work in when 
using requirements, knowing where to look to find an acceptable solution. A downfall to this 
process is that all of the designs within the bounded design space are viewed as equivalent, 
which is highly unlikely when examining the space with primary preferences. 
Requirements-driven design is not a deterministic design process. It allows for 
multiple optimal systems to exist and additional judgment is required to make a final decision 
on which system to move forward with. Using requirements to communicate design 
preferences on system attributes has shown to be problematic for the development of LSCES. 
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While offering a good starting point for 
engineers, this collection of checklist items 
has been found to be a culprit for schedule 
delays and cost overruns. It is estimated that 
the Department of Defense lost $208 million 
per day in the 2012 fiscal year from program 
cancellations and delays [20]. Requirements 
may overstate specifications, change, and are 
often competing. In addition, the primary 
preference for the system is not 
communicated in the requirements and some 
intuition is needed for a design team to 
understand what the customer wants [21]. 
Figures 3c and 3d demonstrate a simple way 
to mathematically characterize this intuition. 
Trade studies can be used to help balance competing attributes and rank order feasible 
designs. This objective function “weights” the attributes to create a simple linear relationship. 
While it does present a single solution as optimal, it is only an optimal for a contrived 
evaluation metric, often leading to designs that are impossible, such as a design with no mass 
or no cost. Many of the objective functions formed in this manner are unit-less and do not 
have an orderly basis. 
With multiple levels of integration on these complex systems, communicating 
preference by passing requirements quickly constrains the design space and makes it difficult 
 
Figure 3. Design spaces showing ways to 
communicate design preference 
 
 Preference 
 
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
 2
 
Attribute 1 
e) 
 
 
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
 2
 
Attribute 1 
e) 
 
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
 2
 
Attribute 1 
d) 
 
 
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
 2
 
Attribute 1 
c) 
 
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
 2
 
Attribute 1 
b) 
 
 
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
 2
 
Attribute 1 
a) 
10 
to find a feasible solution. Adding an objective function helps with decision making but there 
is a more elegant solution to communicating the preference on the system. Value-Driven 
Design removes the subjectivity and enables the stakeholders to sidestep the need for many 
requirements by using a value function to drive the design process. 
Value-Driven Design and Primary Preferences 
Value-Driven Design (VDD) was started in the early 2000s as an enhancement to 
traditional design methods, such as Systems Engineering (SE), Multidisciplinary Design 
Optimization (MDO), and Multi-Objective Optimization (MOO) [5]. By incorporating ideas 
from Economic Theory in the beginning of the design process, VDD helps to characterize the 
operational need to be satisfied by the 
system. Systems operating in commercial 
markets will be driven by stakeholder 
desires for profit [22]. Systems operating in 
non-commercial markets will be driven by 
stakeholder desires for mission success [23]. 
The novel idea with VDD is to use an 
economic based objective function, called a 
value function, to communicate the operational desire directly to engineers instead of 
passively by requirements and with simple objective functions. Figures 3e and 3f show 
example design spaces when using an appropriate value function. Figure 4 shows the basic 
VDD process, as presented in Paul Collopy’s Value-Driven Design [5]; only phrasing and 
 
Figure 4. Value-Driven Design process 
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presentation and have been modified. The process is not new to design optimization but is 
shown for clarity on how the value function is a part of the loop. 
Value functions allow for design trade-offs to be internalized in the optimization 
method. By placing more effort towards characterizing what is truly desired, better systems 
can be developed. Figure 3f is the ideal design space of VDD; no design constraints and one 
operationally optimal solution. Value functions, in essence, are more meaningful objective 
functions and can be used in existing optimization processes. They can also be used to rank-
order feasible design alternatives in non-iterative design practices. A lot of effort in the VDD 
community has been tailored to creating value functions for aerospace systems [7, 22-27]. 
For commercial system design, the most favored value functions are economic profit, net-
present-profit, and surplus value. 
Monetary-Based Design 
Profit and net-present-profit consider the design from a single company’s operational 
perspective, typically the company doing the design work: “the seller”. The difference 
between revenue and cost is maximized, either in one period with profit or all future periods 
with net-present-profit, to ensure the seller will stay in business. Revenue sources from this 
perspective include system sales and future maintenance procedures. Cost sources come from 
system development and production. The company, or organization, using the system, called 
“the buyer”, is assumed to only affect the revenue stream of the seller, based on the quality of 
the system [28]. This scenario works best when the seller has a monopoly on the specific 
market but the buyer does not. When the buyer also has a monopoly on the market, called a 
bilateral monopoly, surplus value is used instead. 
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Surplus value is the more appropriate value function to use for most commercial 
LSCES. These types of systems, by nature, are a part of markets with large barriers to entry 
and tend to disallow competition [27]. This lack of competition invokes a greater dependency 
between the buyer and the seller which the concept of surplus value supports. Surplus value 
considers the collective profit of all primary stakeholders for the system. Cutting out their 
transactions and assuming they act as one entity, this is the difference between the buyers’ 
revenue streams and the sellers’ cost streams. For example, the surplus value of a commercial 
transport aircraft is the difference between passenger ticket sales over time and the cost to 
create the aircraft [26]. The surplus is divvied into the individual companies’ profits well 
after conceptual design. 
Operational-Based Design 
Commercial systems can use the surplus value idea but non-commercial systems 
cannot. The buyers for these systems are various government entities and they do not have 
monetary revenue streams from operating these systems. Surplus value would only have the 
cost of the buyer to consider in this application. Maximizing this value would lead to a 
system that costs nothing and therefore does not exist. 
To circumvent this relationship flaw, cost-plus contracts and fixed cost contracts have 
been used [29]. The buyer presents their preferences for the system and then enters an 
agreement with the seller to fully reimburse all costs or sets a price to pay for each unit. Each 
contract type has its associated risks. The cost-plus contract has the advantage for the seller 
since they are guaranteed a revenue source as a stated small percentage above the costs to be 
reimbursed. The disadvantage though is that the buyer could be paying quite a bit more than 
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expected should any schedule delays and demonstration setbacks arise. There is also an 
incentive to understate costs during design competitions when this contract type is used [30]. 
The fixed cost contract has the advantage for the buyer in that they know exactly what their 
cost will be. However, they may not be pleased with the outcome of the system if their 
willingness to pay is rather low. The next sections further explore ideas in designing for 
operational abilities.  
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CHAPTER 3  
VALUE FUNCTIONS 
 
This chapter presents different value functions that can be used to design a system 
with the Value-Driven Design (VDD) design philosophy. Some of the equations and ideas 
are new; some are shown as a review of past work from the VDD community. Chapter 2 
introduced the concept of VDD and how economics can have a larger role in the design 
process but it must be emphasized how important it is to understand which viewpoint to take 
when using this process. VDD intends to do to traditional systems engineering (SE) what 
traditional systems engineering did to design and development. Systems engineering took a 
step back, so to speak, from single discipline design to coordinate the efforts of multiple 
disciplines and design teams. It has enabled a small group of individuals to guide the work of 
many and produce more integrated and complex systems in a well thought-out approach. SE 
starts and ends with engineers though. It does not allow for other stakeholders to be well 
integrated in the process. VDD does. VDD takes another step back and actively considers the 
stakeholders’ interest in the system, why they want the system, what role it will fill in their 
operational needs. This includes the companies, the organizations, and the economics of 
designing a system. The value function is central to this idea of economic based design [31]. 
Designing for Monetary Preferences 
Commercial systems exist to create a profit for their stakeholders. These systems help 
provide services but making those services profitable is the primary focus of the 
stakeholders. The stakeholders would not be able to stay in business if their services were not 
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profitable and it would not be wise to pursue business practices that lose money. Monetary 
value functions capture this design preference for money. The system can be designed to 
maximize its profitably as a service or certainly minimize its cost (subject to performance 
specifications). These economic attributes are important to consider in the lifecycle of a 
LSCES as they help ensure both the buying and selling companies can stay in business and 
stay competitive. 
Surplus Value (Collective Profit) 
Many LSCESs are unique in that their sellers work closely with their buyers to fill 
custom needs and ensure both parties have a net gain in value. Surplus value works very well 
to aid in cooperative design of commercial systems. The surplus value, SV, is the collective 
profits of all primary stakeholders in the system, including the seller (designs, develops, 
produces, possibly maintains) and the buyer (operates, maintains) of the system. The benefit 
of using surplus value as the evaluation metric is that sub-contractors and other dependent 
corporations can be included. Equation (1) shows this relationship for an arbitrary number of 
stakeholders, ns. The goal is to maximize the difference between revenue from operations and 
the costs of development and production, removing the middle transactions between the 
buyer and seller. This coalition is used for design purposes only though, as anti-trust laws 
would prevent the players in a bilateral monopoly from merging [32]. The individual 
stakeholder profits are then divvied up later through rationing, bargaining, etc. Past research 
has explored the use of surplus-related, monetary-based value functions to design systems 
such as aircraft and gas-turbine engines [22, 25, 26, 33-35]. 
 
1
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Individual Profit 
In commercial markets that see competition, individual companies may wish to solely 
maintain their perspective when designing a system. The profit for a single company, πi,j, is 
the difference between their revenues, Ri,j, and their costs, Ci,j, in a given time period, shown 
in Eq. (2). The index “i” is used to refer to the company and the index “j” is used to refer to 
the time period (e.g. a fiscal year) being considered.  
 , , ,i j i j i jR C     (2) 
Time can be incorporated into the profit accumulation as well by means of net-
present-profit, NPPi. Net-present-profit accounts for the current value of the anticipated 
future profits, with some manner of discounting, shown in Eq. (3). The discount value, r, is 
used to place emphasis on earlier profit flows and to account for economic inflation. 
Equation (4) shows a special case of Eq. (3) and one more tailored to LSCES. The profit in 
the initial period, πi,0, (e.g. from the acquisition) is different from the profits in future periods, 
πi,j, (e.g. from maintenance, overhauls, etc.) in this scenario. The variable t represents the 
number of future time periods to be accounted for. 
 
 
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 

      (4) 
Individual Revenue 
The first part of the profit equation is the revenue. A business strategy typically 
involves minimizing costs and maximizing revenues. Revenue considers the number of 
products sold and the price they can be sold at. Maximizing this value is good for the 
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business and ensures investment costs during the program life cycle can be covered. Sources 
of revenue include the initial sale of the items, as well as overhaul and maintenance services 
later in the lifecycle. Revenue-based value functions can directly relate customer preferences 
and desires of the system to their willingness to pay for such an item. Market demand models 
must be captured to identify these consumer desires though. Without such studies, the 
revenue models will be inaccurate, leading to sub-optimal designs. 
These revenue models must also take into account the observation that LSCES do not 
typically come “off-the-shelf”. The systems are made in low quantities and only for a 
specific customer or two. With this in mind, it becomes risky to be proactive about making 
LSCES before buyers have committed. Instead, the seller will usually be under contract to 
complete the system, common forms being the fixed-cost contract and the cost-plus contract 
[29]. In the fixed-cost contract, the revenue is stated up front and the seller makes a profit 
from the surplus in their development and production costs. In the cost-plus contract, the 
source of revenue is stated to be an agreed upon percentage above the seller’s cost. 
Individual Cost 
Project cost is an important attribute to manage in the life cycle of a LSCES. One of 
the most produced jet-propelled fighter aircraft in existence, the F-16 Fighting Falcon, started 
in a design competition asking for a low-cost aircraft [36]. Among a few other requirements, 
the United States Air Force’s Lightweight Fighter competition called for a cheaper, easy to 
maintain aircraft. Today, the F-16 Fighting Falcon is one of the most produced jet-propelled 
fighter aircraft in existence, having over 4,500 units made. The program has been very 
successful with aircraft operating in 25 countries [37]. 
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Minimizing cost is the primary goal of many supply chain managers. This goal is 
seen in the use of simple system designs, lean manufacturing practices, and by purchasing 
standardized systems to lower the per-unit cost (i.e. taking things “off-the-shelf”). If the costs 
of a program are too great or grow too much, companies may lose orders, lose investors, or 
have to recover the losses using other programs in the company. Many newer defense 
projects have had to decrease the number of orders because of cost growths [38]. 
The cost of developing, testing, evaluating and producing an aircraft program can be 
estimated by Eq. set (5). The cost, Ci,0 (in USD), comes from the perspective of the prime 
contractor and is decomposed into the airframe program cost [39] and the turbofan engine 
program cost [40]. Eq. (5) has been modified from the source material to match SI units and 
have a nomenclature consistent with this document. 
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The airframe program cost, CAirframe (in USD), is directly related to the empty weight 
of the aircraft, WEmpty (in N), the maximum aircraft velocity, VMax (in m/s), and the quantity of 
aircraft desired, Q. The engine program cost, CEngine (in USD) is broken down into engine 
development costs, CEngine,Dev (in USD) and engine production costs, CEngine,Prod  (in US$). If 
the engine is to be taken “off-the-shelf” and does not require development, CEngine,Dev may be 
ignored. The engine costs are dependent on the sea-level static thrust, TSLS (in N), the 
maximum inlet Mach number, MMax, and the turbine inlet static temperature, T4 (in K). These 
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costs are also directly related to the number of engines to be produced, presented here as the 
product of the number of engines on the aircraft, nEng, and, again, the quantity of aircraft 
desired, Q. The cost relations are affected by the year of acquisition as well, due to inflation 
affecting worker wages, material costs, etc. The inflation can be estimated over a time period 
with the Consumer Price Index, CPI [41]. 
Additional costs a company may consider in the life cycle of the system are the costs 
for support and maintenance. These costs are a result of system repairs, overhauls, basic 
upgrades, and training. For the analyses in this document, the assumption is made that the 
maintenance costs for the prime contractor, Ci,j,MT are 5% of the initial investment cost each 
year the system is in service, shown in Eq. (6). 
 , , ,00.05i j MT iC C   (6) 
If the desire of the stakeholder of a for-profit company (i.e. the prime contractor, the 
seller, etc.) is to minimize cost then Eqs. (5) and (6) would be used as the value function in 
the early stages of design. This value function would be communicated down to the designers 
to guide their decision making process. With the attributes captured in the value function, the 
designers would look to drive the empty weight of the aircraft, the maximum velocity and the 
quantity produced to minima. Without requirements, this simple value function would result 
in an aircraft that weighs nothing and does not move; it does not exist. While this plane is 
unreasonable, it does accomplish the stakeholder’s desire of minimizing cost. The cost value 
function illustrates the importance in properly understanding the desires of the stakeholder, 
as was illustrated previously in Figure 3. Figure 5 shows the design space when using the 
minimize cost preference. This figure looks at the airframe cost in a program of 500 aircraft 
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in the 2014 fiscal year (FY). Figure 5 shows how the cost value function drives the designers 
to an unreasonable airplane configuration. 
In these value functions it is important to 
understand that attributes are typically dependent on 
one another. Modifying attributes directly can lead to 
impossible designs. For example, in the design space 
of Figure 5, it is possible to have a plane of zero 
empty weight and a high velocity. This is an 
unrealistic design for an aircraft, resembling a 
photon more than a Phantom [42], but the simple 
design space still allows for it. Even if the airframe 
were negligible, the power plant to produce such a high velocity would cause mass to be 
present. Value functions help communicate design presence but they require a robust analysis 
block to help avoid non-physical solutions. 
Monetary Value Functions with Requirements 
A company operating on its own accord will want to maximize its own profit, or 
perhaps minimize costs, but may be required to satisfy contractual obligations. The 
contractual obligations come in the form of system requirements, specifications, and 
regulations. For example, a new aircraft program could include specifications on the gross 
take-off weight not exceeding 100,000 pounds and the operating range be 2,000 nautical 
miles. Less tangible ideas can be included as well, such as the system must be aesthetically 
pleasing or the system must be user friendly. While adding requirements reduces the 
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allowable design space, and possibly restricts access to the true optimum (recall Figure 3), it 
is an occurrence that must be accounted for. Equation (7) shows an example of this, 
presented in the form of an optimization problem for the designer. 
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2,000
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  (7) 
Designing for Operational Preferences 
The stakeholders of LSCES associated with government entities and nonprofit 
organizations, will, by definition, not have desires centered on profit. These types of 
stakeholders are more focused on operational needs instead of economic ones, most likely 
because a market does not exist to support a revenue stream for the desired system. LSCES 
in this realm deal with desires concerning research expansion, technology demonstration, and 
national defense, among others. This section explores different operational-based value 
functions that may be used to communicate design preference for LSCES in operational 
roles. 
Probability of Operational Success 
Several value functions already exist for designing non-commercial systems. The 
probability of operational success is perhaps the one most attuned to VDD and is derived and 
shown in Eq. set (8) [7, 23]. The probability of operational success, p(OS), accounts for the 
number of systems used in the operation, n, and the probability each system will be 
successful, p(OSi). The operation fails, p(OF), only if every individual system’s operation 
fails, p(OFi). We can reasonably assume that the failure of each system’s operation is 
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independent of any failures of the other systems. The index “i” has no relation to the index 
“i” used for the monetary value functions. Here, it refers to an individual system and does not 
have a specific relation to any stakeholder. Figure 6 shows this design space for up to 10 
systems used in an operation. 
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NASA has had several examples of designing 
systems for operational success, including the Viking 
program [43] and the Mars Exploration Rover Mission 
[44]. In both programs, two rovers were sent to Mars 
to increase the chance at least one made it to the 
surface safely and able to work. This value function 
works well when both the buyer and seller are 
operationally focused and can disregard costs, profits, 
or otherwise. Their primary preferences are aligned 
towards the success of the mission to be performed by the systems. Interdiction missions, 
evasive maneuvers, and communication networks also have examples of this operational 
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focus. Using more systems to accomplish a task can 
reduce the overall risk. This is performed when the 
systems have a reduced cost per unit. 
Mathematically, the probability an individual 
system will complete its operation is the intersection 
of the survivability, p(S), and the effectiveness of the 
system, p(E|S), shown in Eq. (9). The design space for 
this perspective is shown in Figure 7. 
        |ip OS p S E p S p E S      (9) 
Probability of Survivability 
The probability of survivability is a system attribute that takes into consideration the 
hazardous environment the system will operate in (such as an active warzone) and the 
countermeasures needed (e.g. stealth technologies and control system redundancies) to 
ensure the system will continue to operate as intended. The probability of survivability, p(S), 
is the probability the aircraft will not fail (lost, shot down, etc.) when in operation and is 
shown in Eq. (10). The probability it will fail, p(K), is the product of the susceptibility, p(H), 
and the vulnerability, p(K|H), of the system [45], seen in Eq. (11). This notion can easily 
apply to other systems, such as spacecraft or watercraft, meant to operate in precarious 
environments as well. 
    1p S p K    (10) 
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The probability of susceptibility is the chance the system will be hit. This attribute 
can be improved on a military aircraft by reducing the radar cross section, the infrared 
radiation (from engine exhaust), and the acoustic signature. The aircraft can have a carefully 
shaped airframe, be specially coated in radar absorbing materials, and have a subsonic flight 
plan to reduce the susceptibility. Should the system still be hit by an object (e.g. flax, space 
debris, etc.), the probability of vulnerability is the chance the system will fail if it is hit. 
Vulnerability can be reduced by having redundancies in system configurations, such as 
multiple flight control systems or multiple engines, and by spreading critical components 
throughout the plane [21]. Both components of survivability are important for building a 
successful system. 
Probability of Effectiveness 
The probability of effectiveness, p(E|S), is defined as the chance the system can 
accomplish the operation (given that it can already survive it). For aircraft in military 
campaigns, the effectiveness relates to the payload size and how much can be carried to 
complete such operations as interdiction and support missions. For interplanetary 
spaceflights this ensures the cargo will stay intact from launching until landing between 
planets. 
Probability of Campaign Success 
If the systems are meant to operate in more than a single operation, such as in a 
campaign where there will be multiple operations and missions, the probability of campaign 
success may be a desire of the stakeholder. The probability of campaign success, p(CS), is 
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the probability all operations are successful. The probability of campaign success is the 
probability of operational success raised to the mth power, where 𝑚 is the number of 
operations to complete in the campaign, shown in Eq. (12). This mathematical form assumes 
the success of each operation is independent of the other operations. 
     
m
p CS p OS   (12) 
Probability of Lifetime Success 
For many systems, such as aircraft carriers and military aircraft, the stakeholders 
desire the system to be capable of performing multiple campaigns. This leads to a value 
function that captures the lifetime success of the system. If the systems are intended to have 
long lifetimes and operate in more than a single campaign then the probability of lifetime 
success, p(LS), can be used as the system’s value, as shown in Eq. (13). Probability of 
lifetime success is calculated in similar manner as probability of campaign success. 
     
t
p LS p CS   (13) 
Operational Cost 
Stakeholders for operation based systems are still limited by the amount of money 
they have to spend. While their desires revolve around operations, the costs from performing 
the operations cannot be overlooked. While the probability of operational success and the 
functions derived from it stay focused on the buyer (the operator) of the system, variations on 
this metric do allow for costs to be included.  
When cost must be accounted for as well, the cost-per-operation metric has been 
used, presented in Eq. (14). The cost-per-operation metric, CPO, is the ratio of the total cost 
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to the buyer, CBuyer, and the expected number of operations over the lifetime, s, of a system. 
The number of operations flown over the lifetime is estimated by using probabilistic 
expectations and time value discounting to determine an expected number of operations [46], 
shown in Eq. (15). Equation (15) introduces the variable y, the mean number of years 
between campaigns. 
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A variation on cost-per-operation is the cost-per-kill [47], or more generally, the cost-per-
success metric, CPSi. This metric is the ratio of the cost of the attempt, CPO, and the 
probability the attempt will succeed, p(OSi), shown in Eq. (16). 
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Cost per success can be modified from the individual system attempt to a group perspective, 
accounting for the optimal number of attempts as well [23]. This can be accomplished with 
either multiple systems attempting a single time or with a single system attempting multiple 
times. The group cost-per-success metric, CPS, is then the ratio of the cost of a single attempt 
and the negative natural log of the probability a single attempt will fail, shown in Eq. (17). 
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Overall Success 
Stakeholders may not have narrow desires such as operational success or campaign 
success. Many world and military leaders have a desire that can be categorized as overall 
success. Overall success captures the notion that a conflict is not resolved through excessive 
military force, as the previously discussed probability of operational success would push 
towards. Overall success takes into account such ideas as minimal collateral damage, 
minimal loss of life (on both sides), international politics, and appropriate usage of force to 
manage a conflict. From a weapon system design standpoint, overall success becomes a 
balancing act between what is effective and what is appropriate. Weapons that are highly 
effective could stop a conflict quickly but will bring a large amount of collateral damage as 
well. This collateral damage may be more than just the immediate physical damage, 
including global economic repercussions and the initiation of further conflicts and standoffs. 
On the contrary, weapons that are not effective enough will delay progress in the conflict 
intervention.  
For the conflict itself, there are two primary perspectives to consider when 
determining the overall success; that of the intervener and that of the target. This goes 
beyond the buyer-seller relationship of the system, as discussed in the previous sections. The 
focus is now on the buyer’s ability to conduct a successful campaign in the targeted area; the 
designed system being only a part of that vision. The military intervention must be 
satisfactory from both perspectives to be considered an overall success. This starts with the 
intervener’s operational successes and discriminatory usage of force and extends to ensuring 
the violence does not continue or escalate. Thus, overall success, as conflict management, 
becomes more than just a series of checklists [48] and  must be evaluated with a critical eye 
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in policy and politics. A value function of overall success could be captured by measuring the 
economic stability of the region in need of attention. 
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CHAPTER 4  
COOPERATIVE DESIGN WITH VDD 
 
A relationship between the buyer and the seller of non-commercial LSCES is still 
needed. As discussed in Chapter 3, value functions are focused on designing either for 
operational preferences or for monetary preferences. If the seller of the system is publicly or 
privately held, their goals do not directly translate to the buyer’s goals of mission success. A 
non-government entity selling mission-based systems still has a primary preference for 
money. Design can be done by using one of the mission-focused value functions and a 
specific contract type, but an optimal design is not guaranteed, at least not one that is optimal 
from both perspectives. 
The goal of VDD is shifting towards efficiently producing optimal designs from both 
the buyer’s and the seller’s perspective. For mission-based LSCES, having a government as 
the single buyer from a non-government seller quickly becomes a government sponsored 
monopoly. The aerospace industry has been reduced to a collection of monopolies because of 
this [27]. From the seller’s perspective, this may be more desired than designing systems to 
maximize profits but the focus of this paper is on the interactions between entities in existing 
monopolistic markets. 
The key to effectively using VDD to design a system comes from understanding the 
design perspective and the relative power each player has to influence the outcome. Table 1 
summarizes the best value function types for the three potential scenarios for LSCESs. These 
types of systems are analyzed most notably because of the unique markets they create. The 
design is easier when the perspectives align. When they do not, economic bargaining can be 
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used to balance the two players’ desires. This chapter further discusses design perspectives 
and value functions to gain a better understanding of the power they have when creating 
systems. 
Table 1. Value Function Summary 
Buyer Seller Value Function 
Commercial Commercial Surplus Value 
Government Government Probability of Operational Success 
Government Commercial Bargaining 
Economic Bargaining 
Embedded in the models of game theory and the ideas of cooperative/competitive 
decision making are models related to bargaining [49, 50]. In these games, players take turns 
offering how to divide a resource between each other. The receiving player can either accept 
the offer (Y) or reject it (N) and propose a counteroffer. Figure 8 shows the basic bargaining 
model for two players, in extensive form. In this example, the game starts with player 1 
making an offer, (x1, x2), to which player 2 refuses and makes the counteroffer (y1, y2). Each 
player has a time discount-factor, δi, to represent their 
respective impatience towards repeating the game; 0 
represents a completely impatient player, 1 represents a 
very patient player. The game continues until a player 
accepts a proposal. Several variations of the game exist but 
this thesis starts with considering two-player games with 
infinite horizons, meaning there is not a limit on the number 
of rounds that can be played. The players have no sense of 
altruism either and are playing strictly for themselves. 
 
Figure 8. Bargain modeling, 
example extensive form 
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The resource being divided has a unit-less size of 1 here. A rational person may think 
the best combination is to split the resource equally in half, but due to time pressures the 
split-line skews in favor of the more patient player. The subgame perfect equilibria for this 
game is shown in Eq. (18) [49]. Player 1 will offer the outcome x* if he leads and player 2 
will offer the outcome y* if he leads. These combinations give the proposing player the 
highest payoff while making the receiving player indifferent towards accepting and rejecting 
the offer. The equilibria solutions are the preferred outcomes in bargaining games as they 
assure an outcome will quickly be reached and each player has gained something. The 
equilibria conditions are shown in Eq. (19) [49]. 
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Bargaining can be used to gather further insight into the buyer-seller relationship of a 
LSCES. The buyer of a non-commercial LSCES will have a primary preference for 
operational success and the seller of the system will have a primary preference for maximum 
profit. Setting aside any contract structures, bargain modeling can be used with VDD to 
characterize the system with the best compromise between the preferences of both players. 
They will be bargaining for the attribute split. 
Several assumptions need to be stated for this application from theoretical economics 
to system design. The first assumption is that both players have complete information; both 
are aware of each other’s existence and knowledge set. Further, it is assumed the design 
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space is fully deterministic, at least at the conceptual design phase. The game being played 
will change if both players are unsure of each other. 
Bargaining for Player Profit 
First, we consider how bargaining is applied in the traditional sense of players 
competing for the biggest portion of a resource. This example works intuitively for 
commercial LSCES. As stated before with LSCES systems being used for commercial 
applications, the most favored value function to use for evaluation is the idea of surplus 
value. Surplus value is used to find the best system for the set of stakeholders, not any one 
stakeholder in particular. The buyer will want to maximize his profit – at the probable 
expense of the seller. The seller will want to maximize his profit – at the probable expense of 
the buyer. To circumvent this dilemma, surplus value is used to maximize the collective 
profit of both stakeholders (the terms “stakeholder” and “player” are used interchangeably 
here). However, each stakeholder is still left to wonder what their individual gain will be 
from playing a part in this system development and operation. After the optimal system has 
been determined (via the surplus value metric), the transaction between the players will still 
have to take place. They will bargain for the price of the system to attempt to maximize their 
own profit.  
Let the buyer be player 1 and the seller be player 2 in this example. They both want to 
maximize their profit from the available surplus. If given the chance, the buyer will set the 
price of the system at P1 and the seller will set the price at P2. Both price estimates are 
functions of the system attribute set, A, to have a logical basis for each player’s asking price, 
shown in Eq. (20). 
33 
 
 
 
1 1
2 2
P P A
P P A


  (20) 
The buyer’s valuation of the system, V, is also based on the system attribute set. For a 
commercial system, this would represent the revenue streams from operating the system (e.g. 
passenger ticket sales on a transport aircraft, energy sales from a power plant, etc.). The cost 
of development and production to the seller, C, is also a function of the system attribute set, 
shown in Eq. (21).  
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The surplus value, SV, is the difference between the system value to the buyer and the 
system cost to the seller. Eq. (22) shows this relationship. This is the value the players will 
bargain over and decide how it will be split up. They will each, in turn, make an offer on how 
to divide this resource between each other by bargaining for the price. 
 SV V C    (22) 
To expedite the negotiations, a player can offer an equilibria payoff. The payoff 
equilibria are shown in Eq. (23). If the buyer leads in proposing a system design, his payoff, 
in equilibrium, will be the difference between his value of the system and the asking price. 
The seller’s payoff will be the difference from the buyer’s asking price and the costs of 
development. These are payoffs, the benefit each player will receive from accepting the offer. 
The buyer must pay for the system but will receive his perception of its value. The seller 
must pay for the cost of producing the system but receives revenue to produce a profit.  
If the seller leads in proposing the system design, he receives, in equilibrium, the 
difference from the asking price and the cost of production. The buyer gains a surplus from 
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the difference of his valuation and the asking price of the seller. These strategies are a set of 
strategies in a much larger set and are used in this section to describe the bargaining of 
surplus value through price.  
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The two prices can be solved for using Eqs. (19) and (23), and are shown in Eq. (24). 
The price each player will try to set is a function of the impatience factors, δ1 and δ2, the 
buyer’s value of the system, V, and the seller’s cost of the system, C. 
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The equilibrium payoffs are shown in Eq. (25), where the prices from Eq. (24) have 
been substituted into Eq. (23). The payoffs are no longer a function of the asking prices but 
instead, the characteristics of the players. These two equation sets show the relative 
bargaining power each player has. A special case is shown in Eq. (26) where the players have 
the same patience factor, δ. In this special case, the surplus is split almost evenly except that 
the player receiving the offer has the added impatience factor. 
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The payoffs are shown more comprehensively in 
Figure 9. Figures 9a and 9b show the buyer’s and seller’s 
payoffs, respectively, from the buyer’s equilibrium offer, 
x*. Figures 9c and 9d show the buyer’s and seller’s payoffs, 
respectively, from the seller’s equilibrium offer, y*. For 
both players, it is more rewarding to be patient. The 
offering player will take advantage of the receiving player’s 
desire to end the game quickly and reward themselves with 
a higher payoff. 
Bargaining for Attributes 
Bargaining over how to split the surplus value of a 
system works well for commercial LSCES because both 
players have monetary preferences. When the players’ 
preferences do not have the same basis though, other 
variations of the bargaining model can be used. For 
instance, the two players can directly bargain over the 
attribute set to use for the system. This final attribute set to 
use for the design, EA, shown in Eq. (27), would start as the 
lottery between both players’ favored attribute sets, A1 and 
 
Figure 9. Payoffs as they relate 
to player impatience 
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A2, respectively. The buyer favors A1 since it represents the optimal system for his desire of 
mission-success (i.e. probability of operational success). The seller favors A2 since it 
represents the most profitable system design.  
The influence factor, q, would then be solved for from the equilibria payoffs (Eq. (28)
) and the equilibria conditions (Eq. (19)) to determine the final attribute set to use for the 
system design. Equation (29) presents the final equations to solve for. They are non-linear 
but do allow for an interpolation between the two points in the design space, A1 and A2. This 
final, interpolated point will have benefits for both players even though they are not after the 
same goals.  
  1 21EA qA q A     (27) 
 
          
          
* * *
1 2 0 1 1
* * *
1 2 2 0 2
, ,
, ,
x x x V EA V A P A C A
y y y V A V A P EA C A
   
   
  (28) 
 
        
        
1 0 1 1
2 0 2 2
V EA V A P A C A
V A V A P EA C A


  
  
  (29) 
Bargaining for System Price with only Seller Offers 
If the system attribute set is not available for bargaining, the players can still bargain 
over the price of the system. The seller can still attempt to maximize his profit for a given 
system by bargaining for the price to sell it for. This would move the bargaining into the 
analysis block of the design process as part of the operational and business analyses. After 
each design iteration, the seller will try to sell the system configuration at the highest price. 
The buyer can either accept or decline this system at the selling price. If the price is too high 
and the system performance too low, he can reject the system and tell the seller to try again. 
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The design loop will continue to iterate until something can be agreed upon. The seller is 
trying to maximize his profit here but, with bargaining, has a better way to estimate the price 
the buyer is willing to pay. Bargaining can be used to enhance the VDD process. VDD 
already accounts for designing a system for its primary preference - the only addition needed 
is to consider the interaction between the buyer and seller. Bargaining is a repeated game in 
competition, but it is through the repetition that a forced cooperation exists. This makes 
bargaining an ideal method to balance competing preferences and still find an effective 
solution. The bargaining interactions are the 
greatest benefit to creating a LSCES as it 
ensures the best system is made and all 
stakeholders are happy. Figure 10 shows the 
VDD process again and presents the addition of 
bargaining to the evaluation stage. The buyer is 
focused on the operational attributes of the 
system and the seller is focused on the value the 
system will produce for them. Bargaining helps 
balance their preferences. 
Role of Bargaining in Design 
The knowledge of the bargaining process empowers the designer (seller) to be able to 
predict the final payoff after a negotiation period. In essence, the bargaining model becomes 
an additional step in the system analysis stage of the design process (and in the evaluation 
stage of the VDD cycle). A designer can produce a set of design variables, analyze the 
 
Figure 10. Value-Driven Design with 
bargaining 
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attributes associated with those design variables, and then mathematically determined the 
payoff they would receive from the bargaining game’s equilibria. This analysis then enables 
the designer to perform an optimization using the payoff as the objective function. In this 
manner, the bargaining model improves the fidelity of the value function (the payoff) by 
incorporating the impatience of the buyer and seller and their often conflicting value 
preferences. The bargaining model is related to revenue models which have traditionally tried 
to predict the buyer’s behavior through simple monetary functions [7, 28]. Bargaining 
models offer improved fidelity to the designer’s value calculation which can be easily 
implemented in traditional system analyses and design optimization processes. 
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CHAPTER 5  
APPLICATION, RESULTS 
 
It is critical that the interactions and preferences of both the buyer and seller be taken 
into account during the design of a LSCES. This chapter compares the value-based, optimal 
designs for several of the perspectives shown in Chapter 3 and explores the cooperative ideas 
discussed in Chapter 4 for a notional strategic strike aircraft program. Through traditional 
VDD, the non-commercial system can be designed to satisfy either the monetary preferences 
of the seller or the operational preferences of the buyer. With the addition of bargaining 
though, a balance between these preferences sets can be achieved to allow for a system that is 
beneficial to both players. 
In this case study, a government entity will buy and a for-profit, commercial entity 
will develop, produce, and sell the system. The company will go through the conceptual, 
preliminary, and detailed phases of design to accommodate their customer’s acquisition 
process. At the end of each design phase, a review will take place to check progress and 
ensure the buyer is pleased with the proposed design and its developmental progress. The 
buyer is focused on acquiring a system with the highest probability of operational success by 
their standards (Eq. (8)), but the seller is still focused on a system with the highest anticipated 
net present profit (Eq. (4) and [7]). The design team can propose any design they like, but if 
the government entity decides the proposed system does not have enough value or is not in 
line with their needs, they can opt out of funding further development on the project.  
The buyer and the seller each want a system that maximizes their own value, recalling 
the individualistic assumptions from bargaining theory. Each player is playing this “game” 
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for themselves. The dichotomy in desires can be bridged with bargaining though and allow 
the designers to determine a system valuable to both parties. This system will not be the most 
profitable or the most operationally successful, but will effectively tailor both parties’ desires 
for total market control. However, to be clear, this chapter is not a demonstration or 
advocation of war profiteering techniques; the seller presenting a system that is just 
beneficial enough to the group of buyers so they sign a check has unethical implications, 
especially when the systems are intended for use in warfare and with the ability to take lives. 
This work is solely demonstrating the optimums associated with competing design 
perspectives and how negotiation tactics can be a part of the engineering process. This 
chapter focuses on the first stage of the acquisition process: the conceptual design phase. 
System Setup 
Strategic strike aircraft systems are military aircraft with a narrow range of roles to 
fill, making them ideal candidates to start with for exploring the VDD of non-commercial 
systems. These systems have one buyer, one seller, and a single mission plan: cruise out, 
drop ordinance, cruise back. Strategic strike aircraft do not actively engage in air combat but 
may be outfitted with evasive mechanisms and special design features. Current aircraft 
falling into this category include the Rockwell (now Boeing) B-1 Lancer [51], the Northrop 
Grumman B-2 Spirit [52], and the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress [53]. These aircraft have been 
designed to carry large payloads and be reusable as interdiction platforms. Many of the 
current multirole aircraft can fill this role as well, such as the McDonnell Douglas (now 
Boeing) F-15E Strike Eagle [54], McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing) F/A-18 Hornet [55], 
Lockheed Martin (still Lockheed Martin) F-22 Raptor [56], and Lockheed Martin (still 
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Lockheed Martin) F-35 Lightning II [57]. The multirole systems tend to be smaller but, as a 
squadron, offer effective tactical strike capabilities. Missile systems and other unmanned 
aerial vehicles can fill this support role too, but are not included in the analysis. 
An aircraft design model was developed to create a robust analysis block for use in 
the design optimization loop [21, 45, 58, 59]. 0 holds the MATLAB codes used to build the 
model and Fig. 11 shows this model in its design structure matrix form (DSM). The model 
includes sizing methods for the airframe aerodynamics, system propulsion, and performance 
specifications. Additionally, economic and operational analyses have been added to allow for 
the value-based optimization to take place by actively considering the true desires of each 
stakeholder, which are rooted in these categories. Coupling suspension has also been applied 
to the DSM to simplify the analysis from more involved methods but is still sufficiently 
coupled for this case study (the effects of coupling suspension have been investigated 
previously for satellite systems with favorable insights towards creating simpler, yet effective 
models [60]). Further, this analysis block has been sequenced so only feed-forward couplings 
exist. 
 
Figure 11. Aircraft design variables and design structure matrix 
The generic airframe is also shown in Figure 11 and takes significant inspiration from 
current stealth technologies and the mission critical aircraft previously mentioned. The 
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airframe has 6 design variables to manipulate in the design sequence, three of which are 
chord lengths (c1, c2, and c3), two are span lengths (b1 and b4), and the last is the leading edge 
sweep angle of the first wing-body section (Λ1). The other dimensions are driven by body 
relations to keep the edges parallel, decreasing the susceptibility of the aircraft by minimizing 
the directions the reflected radar waves travel [45]. Together, these dimensions and features 
characterize an arbitrarily shaped blended-wing-body aircraft. 
Table 2 shows the set of attributes used to 
characterize the aircraft. This attribute set is only 
able to describes the basic performance of the 
aircraft but is comprehensive enough to still 
interface well with both of the stakeholder desires 
emulated in their value functions. In the following sections, these attributes are displayed 
next to each of the optimal designs to be discussed; each optimal design being in regard to a 
different value of a stakeholder. 
Seller’s Design 
The seller of the non-commercial system employs teams of engineers, scientists, 
analysts, manufacturers, technicians, managers, and more to support the various types of 
work throughout its lifecycle. The seller is fully aware of the cost of the system and is 
conscious about the fact that, as a business, they need to turn a profit from the work they do. 
Under the VDD philosophy, their primary desire is to design a system from a monetary 
standpoint. 
Table 2. System attributes 
Attribute Name 
WGTO Gross take-off weight 
WPayload Payload weight 
Range Aircraft operating range 
MCruise Cruising Mach number 
CUnit Unit cost of aircraft 
p(S) Probability of survivability 
p(E) Probability of effectiveness 
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Figure 12 shows the optimal system associated with each of the three different 
monetary desires the seller may have. Figure 12a shows the system satisfying the seller’s 
potential desire to maximize their revenue from the aircraft program, Figure 12b shows the 
system satisfying the minimum cost preference, and Figure 12c shows the system that best 
satisfies the desire to maximize profit. The geometry is simple in each case and the airframes 
are sized mostly for cruising range. These three systems use the available cargo weight to 
carry more fuel instead of payload, inadvertently making any one system less effective as a 
strike weapon. However, the seller may be able to sell more systems in this way, as each 
system is still survivable, and then be able to reduce the per-unit production cost. Having a 
large fleet of aircraft to maintain in the coming years will be profitable and is already a 
common business practice. It displaces competitors’ products and with the program 
continually being active, facilitates system upgrades at lower costs too.  
The minimum cost aircraft does not have the capacity to carry munitions in its 
“optimal” configuration. The maximum revenue aircraft is much bigger, but with its 
grandiose payload capacity, the seller will not be able to sell as many, increasing the unit 
cost. Instead, the seller will attempt to market the system that provides the maximum profit. 
This system falls somewhere between the extremes of the minimum cost and maximum 
revenue designs. It has a reasonable payload capacity, a long cruising range, and a modest 
unit cost. The seller anticipates that the (relatively) low price will be attractive to the buyer 
but the lack of payload capacity will still make it a hard sell as a strike platform. 
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Buyer’s Design 
The buyer is focused on the operational attributes of the system. While cost is a 
consideration for them, their primary desires are towards the abilities of the system. Figure 
13 shows the three optimal designs for the possible operational ideas the seller may desire; 
the most survivable, the most effective, or the most operationally successful system.  
Figure 13a shows the most survivable system. This system has a payload capacity 
similar to the B-2 [52], but because it is smaller, does not have room for fuel. Without the 
fuel to make it fly and have an operating range, it will be very safe sitting in the hanger; very 
survivable behind closed doors. Figure 13b shows the most effective system. This system 
costs almost 3 times as much as the solely survivable system but does have room for fuel, can 
fly, and has a much larger payload capacity. These systems push the desires of the 
operational-based stakeholder to extremes but, like the cost and revenue value functions of 
the seller, demonstrate how important the perspective of the value function is. 
The buyer wants a system with the greatest probability of operational success. Figure 
13c shows the system that best satisfies this preference. This aircraft is faster and larger than 
the design the seller desires most. It also has a higher anticipated price tag due to the 
technology development costs. The seller anticipates this design will not be as profitable 
since the technology development will need to be internally funded. 
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System 
Attribute 
Value 
 
WGTO, kN 500  
WPayload, kN 70  
Range, km 9,000  
MCruise 0.5  
CUnit, $M 100  
p(S) 0.93  
p(E) 0.33  
a) Maximize revenue 
 
  
 
System 
Attribute 
Value 
 
WGTO, kN 50  
WPayload, kN 0  
Range, km 8,000  
MCruise 0.5  
CUnit, $M 25  
p(S) 0.99  
p(E) 0.00  
b) Minimize cost 
 
  
 
System 
Attribute 
Value 
WGTO, kN 200 
WPayload, kN 20 
Range, km 8,000 
MCruise 0.5 
CUnit, $M 50 
p(S) 0.97 
p(E) 0.13 
c) Maximize profit 
Figure 12. Seller's best design (monetary preferences) 
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System 
Attribute 
Value 
 
WGTO, kN 400  
WPayload, kN 210  
Range, km 0  
MCruise 0.8  
CUnit, $M 300  
p(S) 0.99  
p(E) 0  
a) Survivable 
 
  
 
System 
Attribute 
Value 
 
WGTO, kN 1,600  
WPayload, kN 800  
Range, km 1,000  
MCruise 0.95  
CUnit, $M 800  
p(S) 0.86  
p(E) 0.99  
b) Effective 
 
  
 
System 
Attribute 
Value 
WGTO, kN 1,300 
WPayload, kN 700 
Range, km 5,000 
MCruise 0.9 
CUnit, $M 500 
p(S) 0.92 
p(E) 0.98 
c) Operational 
Success 
Figure 13. Buyer's best design (operational preferences) 
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Design through Bargaining 
The buyer and seller are clearly at odds with each other when designing the system 
for their primary operational preference. The seller could offer to develop the most profitable 
system but the buyer would then dismiss the program since it is a system that does not meet 
their needs. The buyer could make an offer with their idea of the more advanced system, but 
the seller would not agree to it due to the high development costs and lack of profitability. 
These notions may seem extreme but, for this case study, are purposefully aligned with 
classical bargaining theory in which the players are “perfect” and are solely focused on 
themselves. Future work will use behavioral game theory to understand the extreme 
scenarios and better understand which player has more power in the game.  
A balance must be reached to find the value-based system to move beyond the 
conceptual design phase and on to preliminary design. This is where bargain modeling can 
help the design process. Bargain modeling can re-characterize what the best system is by 
mathematically representing the buyer’s and seller’s preferences and creating an environment 
where their trade-offs are based on bargaining factors such as player impatience and the first 
to offer. Bargaining captures the notion that the seller and buyer want the same thing, 
increased value, but the manner in which they define the value is typically different. 
Figure 14 shows an example of a system that may result due to the bargaining 
process. It is expected that the agreed upon design will not be the designs represented in Figs. 
12 and 13 as they could only result from having a dominant player in the game. A dominant 
player is someone with total market control and who would take advantage of an extremely 
impatient player (a player willing to take any offer, so long as the offer does not negatively 
impact them). In the absence of dominant players, the agreed upon system would be a 
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“balance” between the buyer’s preference for operational abilities and the seller’s preference 
for money. Figure 14 is only used as an example of an anticipated system but, with the 
incorporation of behavioral game theory, future work will look at the effects of player 
impatience on the game. Figure 14’s system displays characteristics from both of the player’s 
preferred designs. The system is survivable, effective, and has a decent cruising range. The 
unit cost is high, but not prohibitive to the seller. Both players have some benefit when 
moving forward with this system. 
   
 
System 
Attribute 
Value 
WGTO, kN 1,000 
WPayload, kN 500 
Range, km 6,000 
MCruise 0.5 
CUnit, $M 400 
p(S) 0.91 
p(E) 0.93 
  
Figure 14. Design through bargaining 
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION 
 
Value-Driven Design stands apart from other system design practices because it 
enables the design optimization process in an efficient and foresighted manner. Instead of 
using high-level requirements to communicate preference and constrain the system design 
space, VDD uses a single value function to find the preferred solution. Value functions are 
economic-based objective functions that capture the desires of the primary stakeholders and 
their full need for the system. Value functions can take several perspectives though and it is 
important to choose the right perspective when committing to building a large scale system. 
With the cost of LSCESs being characteristically high and continuing to be under-budgeted, 
more robust and elegant design techniques, such as VDD, are required to build the integrated 
systems of the future.  
Since LSCESs typically only have one buyer and one seller, a collaborative design 
effort is the most beneficial approach for each stakeholder to consider when defining their 
relationship between each other. The VDD community has already created value functions 
for commercial systems that represent this collaborative effort through the idea of surplus 
value. However, non-commercial systems have yet to be designed in a value-based approach 
that actively benefits both players. The buyer and seller for non-commercial systems do not 
have preferences that align, but through the ideas in economic bargaining, a single solution 
can be determined.  
This thesis has shown how differing preferences between a buyer and a seller 
influence the outcome of the design optimization process and how the gap in desires can be 
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addressed with bargaining techniques. In these scenarios for non-commercial system design, 
each stakeholder has a value function that fully captures their own desires. Since the buyer’s 
and seller’s preferences are not based in the same units (operational-based and monetary-
based preferences, respectively), further direction is needed to enable a mutually beneficial 
optimization. The best solution is not the one satisfying only the buyer or only the seller. The 
best solution is the one that gives each stakeholder some benefit for participating in the 
program. Bargain modeling offers a logical way to balance the competing desires of the 
stakeholders when their values do not directly align. 
 Applying bargain modeling to Value-Driven Design can be further expanded from 
the work in this document. This thesis considered a scenario with one buyer, one seller, and a 
system with one purpose. Future work can look at the effects of competition between 
multiple sellers and even placing them in multi-round design games, similar to the current 
acquisition process but in a value-based context. The effects of buyer competition can also be 
studied wherein each buyer desires slightly different attributes on the design, leading to case 
studies in multi-role systems. This work can also be expanded to understand how sub-system 
development can be achieved while maintaining the high-level, system focus. Finally, the 
effects of repeating games can also be considered with further insight from a historical 
background to envision future market structures and anticipate the best business practices. 
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APPENDIX 
AIRCRAFT DESIGN 
MATLAB Codes 
The work presented in this document was conducted using codes written with 
MATLAB [61] and its scripting language. The SolidWorks software [62] was used to render 
the aircraft images in this document. The following codes take supporting direction from [21, 
45, 58] to size and shape an aircraft. 
Main Program 
% ======================================================================== 
% Copyright: Erik Goetzke, Iowa State University, Department of Aerospace 
% Engineering 
% Last Modified: 12/8/2014 
% ======================================================================== 
  
h_cruise = 12000;   % m 
[~,a_cruise,~,~,~,~]=stdatmo(h_cruise); 
  
W_payload_lim = [0 100000]*9.81; 
V_cruise_lim = [0.5,1.5]*a_cruise; 
Lambda1_lim = [20 60]*pi/180; 
b_lim = [10 20];        % m 
cL_lim = [0.5 1]; 
ct_lim = [2 4]; 
Q_lim = [90, 100]; 
x_lim = 
[W_payload_lim;V_cruise_lim;Lambda1_lim;b_lim;cL_lim;ct_lim;Q_lim]; 
  
p = [h_cruise]; 
pso_parameters = [1,9,1,0.8,1.1,1.1,0.5,1e-3,1e-3,1400]; 
  
[F,x,y,k] = my_pso(@mdo_system,x_lim,11,p,pso_parameters); 
 
W_payload = x(1,:); 
V_cruise = x(2,:); 
Lambda1 = x(3,:); 
b = x(4,:); 
cL = x(5,:); 
ct = x(6,:); 
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CD0 = y(1,:); 
c_t = y(2,:); 
nE = y(3,:); 
range = y(4,:); 
W = y(5:7,:); 
RCS = y(8,:); 
Q = y(9,:); 
Cost = y(10,:); 
Revenue = y(11,:); 
prob_survive = y(12,:); 
prob_eff = y(13,:); 
  
[~,a_cruise,~,~,~,~]=stdatmo(h_cruise); 
M_cruise = V_cruise./a_cruise; 
[x_pos,y_pos,S,Lambda2] = geometry(M_cruise,Lambda1,b,cL,ct); 
  
fprintf('Dimensions\n') 
fprintf('  Lambda1: %6.2f deg.\n',Lambda1*180/pi) 
fprintf('  Lambda2: %6.2f deg.\n',Lambda2*180/pi) 
fprintf('        b: %6.2f m\n', b) 
fprintf('      c_L: %6.2f m\n',cL) 
fprintf('      c_t: %6.2f m\n',ct) 
fprintf('        S: %6.2f m^2\n',S(1,:)) 
fprintf('       AR: %6.2f\n',b.^2./S(1,:)) 
fprintf('\n') 
fprintf('Aerodynamics\n') 
fprintf('      CD0: %6.4f\n',CD0) 
fprintf('     TSFC: %8.6f (kg/s)/N\n',c_t) 
fprintf('  Engines: %2.0f\n',nE) 
fprintf('\n') 
fprintf('Weights\n') 
fprintf('     W_TO: %6.2f kN\n',W(1,:)/1000) 
fprintf('  W_empty: %6.2f kN\n',W(2,:)/1000) 
fprintf('   W_fuel: %6.2f kN\n',W(3,:)/1000) 
fprintf('   W_bomb: %6.2f kN\n',W_payload/1000) 
fprintf('\n') 
fprintf('Performance\n') 
fprintf(' M_cruise: %4.2f\n',M_cruise) 
fprintf('    Range: %8.2f km\n',range/1000) 
fprintf('\n') 
fprintf('Economics\n') 
fprintf(' Quantity: %6f\n',Q) 
fprintf('Prog Cost: %6.2f $B\n',Cost/1e9) 
fprintf('Unit Cost: %6.2f $M\n',Cost./Q/1e6) 
fprintf('Unit Rev.: %6.2f $M\n',Revenue./Q./1e6) 
fprintf('\n') 
fprintf('Probabilities\n') 
fprintf('  Survive: %6.2f\n',prob_survive) 
fprintf('Effective: %6.2f\n',prob_eff) 
fprintf('\n') 
  
geom_to_sldw(x_pos,y_pos,Lambda1,Lambda2) 
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Particle Swarm Optimization (Custom) 
function [F,x,y,k] = my_pso(system,x_lim,ny,p,pso_parameters) 
% 
========================================================================= 
% Copyright: Erik Goetzke, Iowa State University, Department of Aerospace 
% Engineering 
% Last Modified: 12/8/2014 
% 
========================================================================= 
% 
========================================================================= 
% Particle Swarm Optimization 
%   [F,x,y,k] = pso(system,x_lim,ny,p,pso_parameters) 
% =============================== INPUTS 
================================== 
%         system: handle of function name 
%                   system = @functionname 
%                   [F,y] = functionname(x,y,p,converge_crit_sys) 
%          x_lim: limits on design variables                         
(nx*2) 
%                  x_lim(:,1): lower limits 
%                  x_lim(:,2): upper limits 
%             ny: number of behavior variables in system 
%              p: system parameter vector                            
(1*np) 
%                 pso_parameters: [max_F,limit,w,c1,c2,c3,converge_sys,... 
%                                  converge_pso,particles]            
(1*9) 
%                          max_F: maximize F (t/f, 1/0) 
%                             Fi: index of F to use as evaluation criteria 
%                          limit: use the limits on x (t/f, 1/0) 
%                              w: inertial weight (approx 0.8) 
%                             c1: weight on personal best difference (1-2) 
%                             c2: weight on global best difference (1-2) 
%                             c3: weight on neighborhood best difference 
(1-2) 
%                   converge_pso: pso convergence criteria 
%                   converge_sys: system convergence criteria 
%                      particles: (optional) number of particles to use 
% ============================== OUTPUTS 
================================== 
%              F: value of best particle 
%              x: design variables of best particle                  
(nx*1) 
%              y: behavior variables of best particle                
(ny*1) 
%              k: number of iterations to converge 
% 
========================================================================= 
     
    [nx,~] = size(x_lim);       % number of design variables 
    max_F = pso_parameters(1); 
    Fi = pso_parameters(2); 
    limit = pso_parameters(3); 
    w = pso_parameters(4); 
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    c1 = pso_parameters(5); 
    c2 = pso_parameters(6); 
    c3 = pso_parameters(7); 
    converge_crit_sys = pso_parameters(8); 
    converge_crit_pso = pso_parameters(9); 
    if(length(pso_parameters) > 9) 
        particles = pso_parameters(10); 
    else 
        particles = 10*nx; 
    end 
     
    % Populate Design Space and Converge System First Time 
    x = x_lim(:,1)*ones(1,particles) + ... 
        (x_lim(:,2)-x_lim(:,1))*ones(1,particles).*rand([nx,particles]); 
    y = zeros(ny,particles); 
    [F,y] = system(x,y,p,converge_crit_sys); 
     
    % Converge Design Space 
    F_prev = F(Fi,:)+1; 
    if(max_F) 
        F_p_best = F(Fi,:)-1;     % personal best value (maximize value) 
        update_personal_best = @(f,fp) find(f-fp > 0); 
        minmax = @max; 
    else 
        F_p_best = F(Fi,:)+1;     % personal best value (minimize value) 
        update_personal_best = @(f,fp) find(f-fp < 0); 
        minmax = @min; 
    end 
    x_p_best = x;   % personal best position 
    v = zeros(nx,particles); 
    k = 0; 
     
    while(abs(std(F(Fi,:))/mean(F(Fi,:)))>converge_crit_pso && k < 100) 
        % Find personal bests 
        s = update_personal_best(F(Fi,:),F_p_best); 
        F_p_best(s) = F(Fi,s); 
        x_p_best(:,s) = x(:,s); 
  
        % Find global best 
        [~,s] = minmax(F_p_best); 
        x_g_best = x_p_best(:,s); 
         
        % Find neighborhood best 
        if(false) 
            % non-dimensionalize distance by limits on design space 
            particle_distance = zeros(particles,particles); 
            for i=1:nx; 
                particle_distance = particle_distance + ... 
                    ((ones(particles,1)*x(i,:) - x(i,:)'... 
                    *ones(1,particles))/(x_lim(i,2)-x_lim(i,1))).^2; 
            end 
            particle_distance = 
+(~logical(floor((particle_distance.^0.5)/(0.1*nx^0.5)))); 
            % indicies with "1" are within 10% distance 
            particle_distance(particle_distance == 0) = NaN; 
            [~,s] = minmax(F'*ones(1,particles).*particle_distance,[],1); 
            x_n_best = x(:,s); 
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        else 
            x_n_best = x; 
        end 
        % Update x vectors 
        v = w*v +(ones(nx,1)*rand(1,particles)).*(c1*(x_p_best                  
-x))+... 
                 
(ones(nx,1)*rand(1,particles)).*(c2*(x_g_best*ones(1,particles)-x))+... 
                 (ones(nx,1)*rand(1,particles)).*(c3*(x_n_best                  
-x)); 
        x = x+v; 
        if(limit)  % Check for particles outside limits 
            for i=1:nx; 
                s = find(x(i,:) < x_lim(i,1)); 
                x(:,s) = x(:,s) - v(:,s).*abs(ones(nx,1)*((x_lim(i,1)-
x(i,s))./v(i,s))); 
                s = find(x(i,:) > x_lim(i,2)); 
                x(:,s) = x(:,s) - v(:,s).*abs(ones(nx,1)*((x_lim(i,2)-
x(i,s))./v(i,s))); 
            end 
        end 
         
        % Converge system with new x 
        F_prev = F(Fi,:); 
        [F,y] = system(x,y,p,converge_crit_sys); 
        k = k+1; 
        fprintf('.') 
        if(mod(k,10) == 0) 
            fprintf('\n') 
            v = zeros(nx, particles); 
        end 
    end 
    fprintf('\n') 
    [~,s] = minmax(F_p_best); 
    x = x(:,s); 
    y = y(:,s); 
    F = F(Fi,s); 
end 
Aircraft Analysis Block (DSM) 
function [F,y] = mdo_system(x,y,p,converge_crit_sys) 
% 
========================================================================= 
% Copyright: Erik Goetzke, Iowa State University, Department of Aerospace 
% Engineering 
% Last Modified: 12/8/2014 
% 
========================================================================= 
% Finds values that fit the x values provided 
% ================================= INPUTS 
================================ 
% x: design variables                                                   
7xn 
%    x(1,:) = payload weight 
61 
%    x(2,:) = cruise velocity 
%    x(3,:) = Lambda1 
%    x(4,:) = b 
%    x(5,:) = cL 
%    x(6,:) = ct 
%    x(7,:) = quantity produced 
% y: behavior variables 
%    [empty] 
% p: parameters                                                         
1xn 
%    p(1,:) = h_cruise: cruising altitude 
% converge_crit_sys: system convergence criteria 
%    [empty] 
% ================================ OUTPUTS 
================================ 
% F: Value/Objective function                                           
9xn 
%    F( 1,:) = range 
%    F( 2,:) = gross take-off weight, N 
%    F( 3,:) = designer cost, USD 
%    F( 4,:) = designer revenue, USD 
%    F( 5,:) = designer profit, USD 
%    F( 6,:) = probability of survivability 
%    F( 7,:) = probability of effectiveness 
%    F( 8,:) = probability of operational success 
%    F( 9,:) = bargained design 
% y: behavior variables                                                
13xn 
%    y( 1,:) = profile drag coefficient 
%    y( 2,:) = thrust specific fuel consumption 
%    y( 3,:) = number of engines 
%    y( 4,:) = range 
%    y( 5,:) = gross take-off weight, N 
%    y( 6,:) = empty weight, N 
%    y( 7,:) = fuel weight, N 
%    y( 8,:) = radar cross section 
%    y( 9,:) = quantity of aircraft produced 
%    y(10,:) = designer revenue, USD 
%    y(11,:) = designer profit, USD 
%    y(12,:) = probability of survivability 
%    y(13,:) = probability of effectiveness 
% 
========================================================================= 
     
    W_payload = x(1,:);       % N 
    v_cruise = x(2,:);        % m/s 
    Lambda1 = x(3,:); 
    b = x(4,:); 
    cL = x(5,:); 
    ct = x(6,:); 
    Q = x(7,:); 
     
    h_cruise = p(1);    % m 
     
    t(1) = 2;    % m 
    t(2) = 0.5;  % m 
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    % Atmospheric properties 
    [rho_cruise,a_cruise,~,~,~,dvisc]=stdatmo(h_cruise); 
    M_cruise = v_cruise./a_cruise; 
     
    [x_pos,y_pos,S,Lambda2,c_bar] = geometry(M_cruise,Lambda1,b,cL,ct); 
    Re = rho_cruise.*v_cruise.*c_bar./dvisc; 
    [W_fuel] = sizing(S,t,W_payload); 
    [CD0,K] = aerodynamics(M_cruise,Re,2*S(1,:),S(1,:),b,Lambda2,1);           
% aerodynamics 
    [c_t,nE,T_max] = propulsion(b);                                            
% engine 
    [range, W_GTO, W_Empty, W_Fuel] = performance(c_t, CD0, K, S(1,:), ... 
        rho_cruise, M_cruise, W_payload, W_fuel);   % weight estimate 
(range estimation) 
    [RCS,prob_survive,prob_eff] = operations(x_pos, y_pos, 
S(1,:),[t(1),t(2)], ... 
        W_payload, range); 
    [Profit_0,Revenue_0,Cost_0] = 
economics(W_Empty,v_cruise,Q,2013,T_max,nE,... 
        range,W_payload,prob_survive); 
     
    y = 
[CD0;c_t;nE;range;W_GTO;W_Empty;W_Fuel;RCS;Q;Cost_0;Revenue_0;prob_survive
;prob_eff]; 
     
    F(1,:) = range; 
    F(2,:) = W_GTO; 
    F(3,:) = Cost_0; 
    F(4,:) = Revenue_0; 
    F(5,:) = Profit_0; 
    F(6,:) = prob_survive; 
    F(7,:) = prob_eff; 
    F(8,:) = prob_survive.*prob_eff; 
    % F(9,:) = 0.5*F(5,:) + 0.5*F(8,:)*1e11; 
    F(9,:) = 0.5*F(5,:) + 0.5*F(8,:)*3e11; 
     
    figure(1) 
    plot(x_pos,y_pos) 
end  
1976 Standard Atmosphere 
function [rho,a,T,p,kvisc,dvisc,Re_MC]=stdatmo(h,dT) 
% 
========================================================================= 
% 1976 Standand Atmosphere model 
% ================================= INPUTS 
================================ 
%            H: Altitude, m 
%           dT: Temp. offset, C,K 
% ================================ OUTPUTS 
================================ 
%          rho: Density, kg/m^3 
%            a: Speed of sound, m/s 
%            T: Temperature, K 
63 
%            P: Pressure, Pa 
%           nu: Kinematic viscosity, m^2/s 
%           mu: Dynamic viscosity, m^2/s 
%        Re_MC: Reynold's Number/(Mach Number*Characteristic length) 
% 
========================================================================= 
  
    if (nargin < 2) 
        dT = 0; 
    end 
  
    % Constants 
    R=287.05287;    %N-m/kg-K; value from ESDU 77022 
    % R=287.0531;   %N-m/kg-K; value used by MATLAB aerospace toolbox 
ATMOSISA 
    gamma=1.4; 
    g0=9.80665;     %m/sec^2 
    Bs = 1.458e-6;  %N-s/m2 K1/2 
    S = 110.4;      %K 
  
    T = zeros(size(h)); 
    p = T; 
    h_base=[0, 11, 20, 32, 47, 51, 71, 86]*1000;    % m 
    hmax = 90000; 
  
    n1=(h<=h_base(2)); 
    n2=(h<=h_base(3) & h>h_base(2)); 
    n3=(h<=h_base(4) & h>h_base(3)); 
    n4=(h<=h_base(5) & h>h_base(4)); 
    n5=(h<=h_base(6) & h>h_base(5)); 
    n6=(h<=h_base(7) & h>h_base(6)); 
    n7=(h<=h_base(8) & h>h_base(7)); 
    n8=(h<=hmax & h>h_base(8)); 
    n9=(h>hmax); 
  
    T_base = 288.15;    % K 
    p_base = 101325;    % Pa 
    i = 1; 
     
    % Troposphere 
    if any(n1(:)) 
        [T(n1),p(n1)] = gradient_layer(h(n1),h_base(i),T_base,p_base,-
0.0065,g0,R); 
    end 
    [T_base,p_base] = gradient_layer(h_base(i+1),h_base(i),T_base,p_base,-
0.0065,g0,R); 
    i = i+1; 
     
    % Tropopause 
    if any(n2(:)) 
        [T(n2),p(n2)] = 
isothermal_layer(h(n2),h_base(i),T_base,p_base,g0,R); 
    end 
    [T_base,p_base] = 
isothermal_layer(h_base(i+1),h_base(i),T_base,p_base,g0,R); 
    i = i+1; 
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    % Stratosphere 1 
    if any(n3(:)) 
        [T(n3),p(n3)] = 
gradient_layer(h(n3),h_base(i),T_base,p_base,0.001,g0,R); 
    end 
    [T_base,p_base] = 
gradient_layer(h_base(i+1),h_base(i),T_base,p_base,0.001,g0,R); 
    i = i+1; 
  
    % Stratosphere 2 
    if any(n4(:)) 
        [T(n4),p(n4)] = 
gradient_layer(h(n4),h_base(i),T_base,p_base,0.0028,g0,R); 
    end 
    [T_base,p_base] = 
gradient_layer(h_base(i+1),h_base(i),T_base,p_base,0.0028,g0,R); 
    i = i+1; 
  
    % Stratopause 
    if any(n5(:)) 
        [T(n5),p(n5)] = 
isothermal_layer(h(n5),h_base(i),T_base,p_base,g0,R); 
    end 
    [T_base,p_base] = 
isothermal_layer(h_base(i+1),h_base(i),T_base,p_base,g0,R); 
    i = i+1; 
  
    % Mesosphere 1 
    if any(n6(:)) 
        [T(n6),p(n6)] = gradient_layer(h(n6),h_base(i),T_base,p_base,-
0.0028,g0,R); 
    end 
    [T_base,p_base] = gradient_layer(h_base(i+1),h_base(i),T_base,p_base,-
0.0028,g0,R); 
    i = i+1; 
     
    % Mesosphere 2 
    if any(n7(:)) 
        [T(n7),p(n7)] = gradient_layer(h(n7),h_base(i),T_base,p_base,-
0.002,g0,R); 
    end 
    [T_base,p_base] = gradient_layer(h_base(i+1),h_base(i),T_base,p_base,-
0.002,g0,R); 
    i = i+1; 
  
    % Mesopause 
    if any(n8(:)) 
        [T(n8),p(n8)] = 
isothermal_layer(h(n8),h_base(i),T_base,p_base,g0,R); 
    end 
    [T_base,p_base] = 
isothermal_layer(h_base(i+1),h_base(i),T_base,p_base,g0,R); 
    i = i+1; 
  
    if any(n9(:)) 
        T(n9)=NaN; 
        p(n9)=NaN; 
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    end 
  
    T = T + dT; 
  
    rho = p./T/R; 
    a = sqrt(gamma * R * T);     % m/s 
    kvisc = (Bs * T.^1.5 ./ (T + S)) ./ rho; % m2/s 
  
    mu0 = 1.827e-5; % Pa*s 
    T0 = 291.15;    % K 
    C = 120;        % K 
    dvisc = mu0*(T0+C)./(T+C).*(T./T0).^1.5; 
    Re_MC = rho./(dvisc.*a); 
end 
  
function [T,p] = gradient_layer(h,h_base,T_base,p_base,K,g0,R) 
    T = T_base + K*(h-h_base); 
    p = p_base*(T./T_base).^(-g0/(K*R)); 
end 
  
function [T,p] = isothermal_layer(h,h_base,T_base,p_base,g0,R) 
    T = T_base; 
    p = p_base*exp(-g0./(R*T).*(h-h_base)); 
end 
Geometry 
function [x,y,S,Lambda2,c_bar] = geometry(M,Lambda1,b,c_L,c_t) 
% 
========================================================================= 
% Copyright: Erik Goetzke, Iowa State University, Department of Aerospace 
% Engineering 
% Last Modified: 12/8/2014 
% 
========================================================================= 
% ================================= INPUTS 
================================ 
%       b: span                                                         
1xn 
%      bp: span prime                                                   
1xn 
%     c_L: shortest distance from wing edge to nose (projected)         
1xn 
%     c_t: tip chord of wing (wing width)                               
1xn 
% Lambda1: Leading edge sweep angle of body                             
1xn 
% Lambda2: Leading edge sweep angle of wing                             
1xn 
% ================================ OUTPUTS 
================================ 
%       x: x-position of points of interest                            
11xn 
%       y: y-position of points of interest                            
11xn 
66 
%       S: planform area (internal area of polygon)                     
1xn 
% 
========================================================================= 
 
     
    [~,nn(1)] = size(M); 
    [~,nn(2)] = size(Lambda1); 
    [~,nn(3)] = size(b); 
    [~,nn(4)] = size(c_L); 
    [~,nn(5)] = size(c_t); 
    n = max(nn); 
    if(nn(1) == 1) 
        M = M*ones(1,n); 
    end 
    if(nn(2) == 1) 
        Lambda1 = Lambda1*ones(1,n); 
    end 
    if(nn(3) == 1) 
        b = b*ones(1,n); 
    end 
    if(nn(4) == 1) 
        c_L = c_L*ones(1,n); 
    end 
    if(nn(5) == 1) 
        c_t = c_t*ones(1,n); 
    end 
     
    Lambda2 = Lambda1+15*pi/180; 
    bp = b./3; 
     
    [~,n] = size(b); 
         
    m = 11; 
    x = zeros(m,n); 
    y = x; 
     
    s = c_t > (b-bp).*cos(Lambda2); 
    if(sum(s) > 0) 
        cts = (b-bp).*cos(Lambda2); 
        c_t(s) = cts(s); 
    end 
     
    x(1,:) = 0; 
    y(1,:) = 0; 
    x(2,:) = x(1,:) + c_L.*cos(Lambda1)./sin(Lambda2-Lambda1); 
    y(2,:) = y(1,:) + c_L.*sin(Lambda1)./sin(Lambda2-Lambda1); 
    x(3,:) = x(2,:) + (b/2-y(2,:))./tan(Lambda2); 
    y(3,:) = y(1,:) + b/2; 
    x(4,:) = x(3,:) + c_t./(2*sin(Lambda2)); 
    y(4,:) = y(3,:) - c_t./(2*cos(Lambda2)); 
    y(5,:) = (bp/2); 
    x(5,:) = x(4,:) - (y(4,:)-bp/2)./tan(Lambda2); 
    x(6,:) = x(5,:) + (bp/2)./tan(Lambda2); 
    y(6,:) = y(1,:); 
  
    x(7,:) = x(6,:)-abs(x(6,:)-x(5,:)); 
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    y(7,:) = y(6,:)-abs(y(6,:)-y(5,:)); 
    x(8,:) = x(7,:)+abs(x(5,:)-x(4,:)); 
    y(8,:) = y(7,:)-abs(y(5,:)-y(4,:)); 
    x(9,:) = x(8,:)-abs(x(4,:)-x(3,:)); 
    y(9,:) = y(8,:)-abs(y(4,:)-y(3,:)); 
    x(10,:) = x(9,:)-abs(x(3,:)-x(2,:)); 
    y(10,:) = y(9,:)+abs(y(3,:)-y(2,:)); 
    x(11,:) = x(1,:); 
    y(11,:) = y(1,:); 
     
    S = polygon_area(x,y); 
    S(3,:) = 2*polygon_area(x(2:5,:),y(2:5,:));     % Wing 
    S(2,:) = S(1,:)-S(3,:);                         % Body 
 
 
    c_bar = S(1,:)./b; 
end 
 
function A = polygon_area(x,y) 
    [m,~] = size(x); 
    A = x(m,:).*y(1,:) - x(1,:).*y(m,:); 
    for i=1:(m-1); 
        A = A + x(i,:).*y(i+1,:) - x(i+1,:).*y(i,:); 
    end 
    A = abs(A)/2; 
end 
Sizing 
function [W_fuel] = sizing(S,t,W_payload) 
% 
========================================================================= 
% Copyright: Erik Goetzke, Iowa State University, Department of Aerospace 
% Engineering 
% Last Modified: 12/8/2014 
% 
========================================================================= 
    rho_payload = 1372;     % kg/m^3 if the Mark 82 was rectangular 
    rho_fuel = 810;         % kg/m^3 
  
    Total_Volume = S(2,:)*t(1) + S(3,:)*t(2); 
    r = 0.4*(1-exp(-Total_Volume/50));    % estimate 35 % of aircraft 
volume is fuel and payload 
    %r = 0.4; 
    Fuel_and_Payload_Volume = Total_Volume.*r; 
    W_fuel = (Fuel_and_Payload_Volume-
W_payload/9.81/rho_payload)*rho_fuel*9.81; 
    W_fuel(W_fuel < 0) = 0; 
end 
Aerodynamics 
function [CD0,K] = aerodynamics(M,Re,Swet,Sref,b,lambda_tc,tc) 
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% the following function is based on observed trends 
    CD00 = 0.01; 
    CD0 = CD00 * (1+(0.5+atan(50*(M-1-
0.1*sin(lambda_tc)))./pi).*cos(lambda_tc).^2); 
     
    S = Sref; 
    AR = b.^2./S; 
    %e = 1-0.04*AR;      % from Fig G.9 - experimental 
    e = exp(-AR./18);       % similar to line above to continue forever 
    K = 1./(pi*e.*AR); 
end 
Propulsion 
function [c_t, nE, T_max] = propulsion(b) 
% 
========================================================================= 
% Copyright: Erik Goetzke, Iowa State University, Department of Aerospace 
% Engineering 
% Last Modified: 12/8/2014 
% 
========================================================================= 
% 
========================================================================= 
%     b: 
% 
========================================================================= 
%   c_t: Thrust Specific Fuel Consumption 
% 
========================================================================= 
  
    [~,n] = size(b); 
    x = 4*(b/60); 
    x = 4*ones(1,n); 
    c_t = 0.00006*x;    % (kg/s)/N, from F110 (approx 0.00005892 (kg/s)/N 
    nE = min([ceil(4*b/60);4*ones(1,n)]); 
    T_max = 135000;     % N, from F110 
end 
Performance 
function [range, W_GTO, W_Empty, W_Fuel] = performance(c_t, CD0, K, S, ... 
    rho_cruise, M_cruise, W_payload, W_fuel) 
% 
========================================================================= 
% Copyright: Erik Goetzke, Iowa State University, Department of Aerospace 
% Engineering 
% Last Modified: 12/8/2014 
% 
========================================================================= 
    % find range from fuel weight     
    [~,n] = size(W_fuel); 
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    del = 1e-6; 
    del_v = 1 + [-1;0;1]*del; 
    range = del_v*ones(1,n)*10000000;    % guess 1,000 km 
    W_abbrev = ones(3,1)*W_fuel + 20; 
    k = 0; 
    while(max(abs(W_abbrev(3,:) - W_fuel)) > 10 && k<30) 
        W_fuel_m = weight(c_t, CD0, K, S, rho_cruise, M_cruise, W_payload, 
range(1,:)); 
        [W_abbrev,W] = weight(c_t, CD0, K, S, rho_cruise, M_cruise, 
W_payload, range(2,:)); 
        W_fuel_p = weight(c_t, CD0, K, S, rho_cruise, M_cruise, W_payload, 
range(3,:)); 
        range = del_v*(range(2,:) + (range(3,:) - range(1,:))./... 
            (W_fuel_p(3,:) - W_fuel_m(3,:)).*(W_fuel - W_abbrev(3,:))); 
        k = k+1; 
    end 
     
    range = range(2,:); 
    range(range<0) = 0; 
    W_GTO = W(1,:); 
    W_Empty = W(2,:); 
    W_Fuel = W(3,:); 
end 
  
function [W_abbrev, W] = weight(c_t, CD0, K, S, rho_cruise, M_cruise, 
W_payload, range, endurance) 
% ================================= INPUTS 
================================ 
%        c_t: thrust specific fuel consumption                        
(1xn) 
%        CD0: Profile drag coefficient                                
(1xn) 
%          K: Lift induced drag coefficient                           
(1xn) 
%          S: Planform area, m^2                                      
(1xn) 
% rho_cruise: air density at cruising altitude, kg/m^3                
(1xn) 
%   M_cruise: Cruising Mach number                                    
(1xn) 
%  W_payload: Payload Weight, N                                       
(1xn) 
%      range: Aircraft range                                          
(1xn) 
% ================================ OUTPUTS 
================================ 
%   W_abbrev: Weight matrix, abbreviated, N                           
(3xn) 
%               W(1,:) Gross takeoff weight 
%               W(2,:) Empty weight 
%               W(3,:) Fuel weight 
%          W: Weight matrix, N                                        
(mxn) 
%               W(1,:) is gross take-off weight 
%               W(m,:) is empty weight 
% 
========================================================================= 
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% let's just keep everything in SI units 
% Chapter 5 of Fundamentals of Aircraft and Airship Design 
     
    [~,n] = size(CD0); 
     
    reserve = 0.05;     % 5% of fuel is on reserve 
    trapped = 0.01;     % 1% of fuel is trapped in fuel lines 
     
    mission = [0;1;2;4;2;3;6]; 
    m = length(mission); 
    M = zeros(m,n); 
    M(2,:) = M_cruise; 
    M(3,:) = M(2,:); 
    M(4,:) = M(3,:); 
    M(5,:) = M(4,:); 
     
    W = zeros(m,n); 
    Wp = W; 
    Wm = W; 
     
    del = 1e-6; 
     
    W_TO = 2000000; % guess 
    W(1,:) = W_TO; 
    Wp(1,:) = W(1,:)*(1+del); 
    Wm(1,:) = W(1,:)*(1-del); 
    W_empty_e = W_TO+2*del; 
    k = 0; 
    while(max(abs(W(m,:)-W_empty_e)) > 1 && k<30) 
        [W]  = mission_weights(W 
,mission,c_t,CD0,K,S,M,rho_cruise,W_payload,... 
            range/2,reserve,trapped); 
        [Wp] = 
mission_weights(Wp,mission,c_t,CD0,K,S,M,rho_cruise,W_payload,... 
            range/2,reserve,trapped); 
        [Wm] = 
mission_weights(Wm,mission,c_t,CD0,K,S,M,rho_cruise,W_payload,... 
            range/2,reserve,trapped); 
        W_empty_e = 0.986*W(1,:).^0.947;     % in N, 0.911.*W(1).^0.947 in 
lbf; 
        W(1,:) = W(1,:) + (Wp(1,:) - Wm(1,:))./(Wp(m,:) - 
Wm(m,:)).*(W_empty_e-W(m,:)); 
        Wp(1,:) = W(1,:)*(1+del); 
        Wm(1,:) = W(1,:)*(1-del); 
        k = k+1; 
    end 
    W = real(W); 
     
    W_abbrev(1,:) = W(1,:);   % gross take-off weight 
    W_abbrev(2,:) = W(m,:);   % empty weight 
    W_abbrev(3,:) = W(1,:) - W(m,:) - W_payload; 
end 
  
function [W] = mission_weights(W,flight_plan,c_t,CD0,K,S,M,rho_cruise,... 
    W_payload,range_operating,reserve,trapped) 
% ================================= INPUTS 
================================ 
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%          W: Gross takeoff weight                                    
(1xn) 
%flight_plan: Flight plan vector                                      
(mx2) 
%               first column provides flight plan identification number 
%               second column provides useful information 
%               third column provides useful information 
%               1. Acceleration: Mach start, Mach end 
%               2. Cruise:  
%        c_t: thrust specific fuel consumption                        
(1xn) 
%        CD0: Profile drag coefficient                                
(1xn) 
%          K: Lift induced drag coefficient                           
(1xn) 
%          S: Planform area, m^2                                      
(1xn) 
% rho_cruise: air density at cruising altitude, kg/m^3                
(1xn) 
%   M_cruise: Cruising Mach number                                    
(1xn) 
%  W_payload: Payload Weight, N                                       
(1xn) 
%      range: Aircraft range                                          
(1xn) 
% ================================ OUTPUTS 
================================ 
%   W_abbrev: Weight matrix, abbreviated, N                           
(3xn) 
%               W(1,:) Gross takeoff weight 
%               W(2,:) Empty weight 
%               W(3,:) Fuel weight 
%          W: Weight matrix, N                                        
(mxn) 
%               W(1,:) is gross take-off weight 
%               W(m,:) is empty weight 
% 
========================================================================= 
    [m,~] = size(W); 
    for i=2:m; 
        switch flight_plan(i) 
            case 1      % Acceleration (increase in kinetic or potential 
energy) 
                % use for take-off, climbing, and accelerating speed, 
about 0.97 - 0.975 
                W(i,:) = (1 - 0.0278.*M(i,:) - 0.0088.*M(i,:).^2) ./ ... 
                    (1 - 0.0278.*M(i-1,:) - 0.0088.*M(i-1,:).^2) .* W(i-
1,:); 
            case 2      % Cruise (requires cruise distance) 
                W(i,:) = range_breguet_jet_i(W(i-
1,:),range_operating,c_t,... 
                    rho_cruise,S,K,CD0); 
            case 3      % Loiter 
                endurance_loiter = 30*60; 
                W(i,:) = endurance_jet_i(W(i-
1,:),c_t,CD0,K,endurance_loiter); 
            case 4      % Drop payload (requires payload weight) 
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                W(i,:) = W(i-1,:) - W_payload; 
            case 5      % Combat 
                W(i,:) = W(i-1,:); 
            case 6      % Land 
                % this landing stage incorporates fuel reserves and 
trapped fuel estimation 
                W(i,:) = W(1,:) - W_payload - ... 
                    (1+reserve+trapped)*(W(1,:) - W_payload - W(i-1,:)); 
        end 
    end 
end 
 
function [W1] = range_breguet_jet_i(W0,R,c_t,rho,S,K,CD0) 
% maximum range of a jet (flying at max(V*L/D)), assuming it flies at a 
% constant altitude (constant air density) 
    W1 = (W0.^0.5 - (R.*c_t.*(2.*rho.*S).^0.5.*(3*K.*CD0.^3).^0.25)/3).^2; 
end 
  
function [W1] = endurance_jet_i(W0,c_t,CD0,K,E) 
% maximum endurance of a jet (flying at max(L/D)) 
    W1 = W0.*exp(-2*E.*c_t.*(K.*CD0).^0.5); 
end 
Operations 
function [RCS,prob_survive,prob_eff] = operations(x_pos, y_pos, S, t, 
W_payload, range) 
% 
========================================================================= 
% Copyright: Erik Goetzke, Iowa State University, Department of Aerospace 
% Engineering 
% Last Modified: 12/8/2014 
% 
========================================================================= 
    [RCS,prob_survive] = survive(x_pos,y_pos,S,t); 
    [prob_eff] = effective(W_payload, range); 
     
end 
  
function [prob_eff] = effective(W_payload, range) 
    prob_eff = (1-exp(-W_payload./175000)).*(1-exp(-range/11000)); 
end 
  
function [sigma,prob_survive] = survive(x,y,S,t) 
    A1 = t(1)*((x(5,:)-x(1,:)).^2 + (y(5,:)-y(1,:)).^2).^0.5 - ... 
         t(2)*((x(5,:)-x(2,:)).^2 + (y(5,:)-y(2,:)).^2).^0.5; 
    A2 = t(2)*((x(3,:)-x(2,:)).^2 + (y(3,:)-y(2,:)).^2).^0.5; 
     
    s = A1>A2; 
    if(sum(s) == length(A1)) 
        A = A1; 
    elseif(sum(s) == 0) 
        A = A2; 
    else 
        A(s) = A1(s); 
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        A(~s) = A2(~s); 
    end 
    lambda = 1;    % m  0.3 GHz frequency - Long-Range Detection radar 
    sigma = 4*pi*A.^2./lambda.^2; 
    prob_susceptible = 1-exp(-sigma/10); 
    prob_killed = exp(-S./1000); 
    prob_survive = prob_susceptible.*prob_killed; 
end 
Economic Performance 
function [Profit_0,Revenue_0,Cost_0] = 
economics(W_empty,V_max,Q,Year,T_max,nE,range,W_payload,prob_survive) 
% 
========================================================================= 
% Copyright: Erik Goetzke, Iowa State University, Department of Aerospace 
% Engineering 
% Last Modified: 12/8/2014 
% 
========================================================================= 
    Cost_0 = lifecycle_cost(W_empty,V_max,Q,Year,T_max,nE); 
    Revenue_0 = 
0.0075*(range/1000).^2.*W_payload.^0.5.*prob_survive.^6.*Q; 
    Profit_0 = Revenue_0-Cost_0; 
     
end 
  
function [C] = lifecycle_cost(W_empty,V_max,Q,Year,T_max,nE) 
% ================================= INPUTS 
================================ 
% W_empty: Empty weight of aircraft                                     
1xn 
%   V_max: Maximum speed of aircraft                                    
1xn 
%       Q: Quantity of aircraft to produce                              
1xn 
%    Year: Year of production and development                           
1xn 
%   T_max: Maximum engine thrust                                        
1xn 
%      nE: Number of engines per aircraft                               
1xn 
% ================================ OUTPUTS 
================================ 
%       C: Cost of production and development                           
1xn 
% 
========================================================================= 
  
    [HR_Tooling, HR_Engineering, HR_Manufacturing, HR_QualityControl] = 
hourly_rate(Year); 
    [H_Tooling, H_Engineering, H_Manufacturing, H_QualityControl] = 
hourly(W_empty,V_max,Q); 
     
    C_Tooling = H_Tooling*HR_Tooling; 
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    C_Engineering = H_Engineering*HR_Engineering; 
    C_Manufacturing = H_Manufacturing*HR_Manufacturing; 
    C_QualityControl = H_QualityControl*HR_QualityControl; 
     
    inflation = cpi(1977,13,Year,13); 
     
    C_DevelopmentSupport = 25.1*inflation*W_empty.^0.63.*V_max.^1.3; 
    C_FlightTestOperations =  
687*inflation*W_empty.^0.325.*V_max.^0.822.*Q.^1.21; 
    C_ManufacturingMatAndEquip = 
6.08*inflation*W_empty.^0.921.*V_max.^0.621.*Q.^0.799; 
     
    %T_SLS = ; 
    %M_max = ; 
    %T_R = ; 
    %C_ProductionEngine = 2306*(0.043*T_SLS+243.3*M_max+0.969*T_R-2228); 
    C_ProductionEngine = 436*T_max.^0.8356.*Q.*nE; 
     
    C = C_Engineering + ... 
        C_DevelopmentSupport + ... 
        C_FlightTestOperations + ... 
        C_Tooling + ... 
        C_Manufacturing + ... 
        C_QualityControl + ... 
        C_ManufacturingMatAndEquip + ... 
        C_ProductionEngine; 
end 
  
function [HR_Tooling, HR_Engineering, HR_Manufacturing, HR_QualityControl] 
= hourly_rate(Year) 
    HR_Tooling = 2.883*Year-5666; 
    HR_Engineering = 2.576*Year-5058; 
    HR_Manufacturing = 2.316*Year-4552; 
    HR_QualityControl = 2.6*Year-5112; 
end 
  
function [H_Tooling, H_Engineering, H_Manufacturing, H_QualityControl] = 
hourly(W,S,Q) 
    H_Tooling = 5.99*W.^0.777.*S.^0.696.*Q.^0.263; 
    H_Engineering = 4.86*W.^0.777.*S.^0.894.*Q.^0.163; 
    H_Manufacturing = 7.37*W.^0.82.*S.^0.484.*Q.^0.641; 
    H_QualityControl = 0.13*H_Manufacturing; 
end 
  
function c = cpi(Y0, M0, Y1, M1) 
% 
========================================================================= 
% Copyright: Erik Goetzke, Iowa State University, Department of Aerospace 
% Engineering 
% Last Modified: 12/8/2014 
% 
========================================================================= 
% ================================ INPUTS 
================================= 
% Y0: base year 
% M0: base month (1-12 for month selection, outside this range for yearly 
average) 
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% Y1: current year 
% M1: base month (1-12 for month selection, outside this range for yearly 
average) 
%     ex: Y0 = 1986 
%         M0 = 2 
%         Y1 = 2012 
%         M1 = 13 
% =============================== OUTPUTS 
================================= 
% c: cpi1/cpi0 
%     ex: cpi0 = 109.3 
%         cpi1 = 229.594 
%         c = 2.101 
% 
========================================================================= 
    c0 = cpi_lookup(Y0,M0); 
    if(nargin > 2) 
        c1 = cpi_lookup(Y1,M1); 
        c = c1/c0; 
    else 
        c = c0; 
    end 
end 
 
note:  The function “cpi_lookup” is not included here due to its extensive size and it only 
repeating what is found online from the U.S. Burearu of Labor Statistics. 
Aircraft Visualization 
function geom_to_sldw(x_pos,y_pos,Lambda1,Lambda2) 
    c1 = x_pos(6); 
    b1 = y_pos(2)*2; 
  
    c2 = x_pos(6) - y_pos(2)*(1/tan(Lambda1) + 1/tan(Lambda2)); 
    b2 = 2*(y_pos(5)-y_pos(2)); 
     
    c3 = c2 - b2/2*(1/tan(Lambda2) + 1/tan(Lambda2)); 
    b3 = 2*(y_pos(4)-y_pos(5)); 
  
    fprintf('Geometry for SolidWorks Model\n') 
    fprintf('  c1: %6.2f m\n',c1) 
    fprintf('  c2: %6.2f m\n',c2); 
    fprintf('  c3: %6.2f m\n',c3) 
    fprintf('  b1: %6.2f m\n',b1) 
    fprintf('  b3: %6.2f m\n',b3) 
    fprintf(' Lam: %6.2f deg\n',90-Lambda1*180/pi) 
end 
 
note:  This function is used to support a SolidWorks part file that generates the 
configurations shown in this document.  
 
